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wards, Barrett, and Peake 1997) to revisit the effects of divided government on lawmaking. As Fiorina (1996) concludes after assessing much of this recent work, Mayhew's (1991) null finding for the effect of divided party control on government performance has generally held up, albeit with important exceptions.
Nevertheless, there is good reason to revisit the dynamics of policy gridlock. Theoretically, Mayhew was motivated primarily by an interest in the effects of a particular independent variable, namely, divided government. Toward that end, he identified landmark laws in a two-stage process (for details, see Mayhew 1991, chap Although others have offered theoretical and empirical alternatives to Mayhew's contributions, no one has yet tackled both challenges simultaneously. As I argue below, no definitive account of the politics of gridlock is possible until a more robust measure has been used to test an array of competing accounts of variation in gridlock over time.
Empirical Considerations
Consider first the empirical challenge left by Mayhew's work. As Fiorina (1996, 89) argues, "an irreducible ambiguity in Mayhew's findings ... remain [s] . Essentially, he has studied the supply of federal legislation and found that the supply is more or less the same during modem unified and divided government periods. But we have no information about the demand for legislation." To be sure, Mayhew recognized this problem, but he concluded that it is "very difficult to see what a denominator for a Congress-an agenda of potential enactments-might be. 'As demanded by the needs of the time,' perhaps? ... That would be hopeless to administer" (1991, 36) .
Despite the obvious difficulty of developing an "agenda of potential enactments," such a measure is needed to test theories of political stalemate. Gridlock is not the inverse of legislative output. Certainly, a low level of law production may indicate a high level of political gridlock. Alternatively, it may reflect the response of a Congress and president facing a limited political agenda, in which case it may indicate a low level of gridlock. The point is that we just do not know, absent a metric of the broader political agenda. Indeed, 1 Either a contemporary or retrospective judgment of significance was sufficient for a law to be included in the final list. For an alternative approach, see Kelly 1993. 
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as much was once suggested by the New York Times, which editorially cautioned against admiring Congress "in proportion to the volume of bills it grinds out. The only sane criterion is a comparison of its record with the problems before it" ("The Sluggish 91st" 1969).
Theoretical Considerations
Mayhew's null finding for the effect of divided government on legislative output has spurred others to develop more fine-grained theories of legislative performance. Taken together, such works suggest that party control alone cannot account for variation in the legislative performance of Congress and the president. Instead, institutional arrangements alter the strategies of legislators and presidents and thus affect the character and frequency of policy outcomes. Indeed, a recurrent theme in recent work is the effect of supermajority institutions on policy outcomes. Brady and Volden (1998) and Krehbiel (1998) argue, for example, that the policy preferences of supermajority "veto" players in Congress are central to explaining the dynamics of gridlock. As such, these works formalize the intuition that supermajoritarian, rather than majoritarian, models are central to legislative outcomes.
These works are important efforts to think beyond interbranch conflict. Still, institutional arrangements beyond supermajority rules clearly affect legislative outcomes. In particular, we tend to underestimate the policy consequences of the simple institutional fact of bicameralism. Recent work makes clear the need to account for bicameral features in modeling legislative outcomes (e.g., Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis and Money 1997) and reflects observations made earlier by Fenno (1982) , Longley and Oleszek (1989) , and Smith (1988) .
Finally, it is important to remember that recent theoretical treatments of gridlock have been tested primarily with Mayhew's data on legislative enactments. That is, theories crafted to account for episodes of legislative stalemate have been tested with data on legislative success. But if policy gridlock is not simply the inverse of legislative output, then the empirical robustness of such theories is difficult to judge. In short, much more needs to be learned about the proportions and causes of legislative gridlock. Integrating new theoretical observations with a more robust measure of gridlock may yield new findings about its political dynamics.
THE DYNAMICS OF GRIDLOCK
Recent work on the politics of legislative productivity encourages us to think along two separable dimensions: partisan and institutional (but see D. Jones 1998, who suggests that the interaction between the two is central to modeling legislative productivity). Partisan models focus primarily on the effect of divided party control of Congress and the presidency, while institutional models emphasize the effect of supermajority rules. These works provide an important but ultimately only partial accounting of the electoral and institutional dynamics underlying gridlock in the legislative process.
The Partisan and Electoral Context
Partisan theories of legislative gridlock traditionally have centered on the effect of divided government on policy outcomes. The logic is straightforward: Unified party control of the two branches guarantees an important extraconstitutional link between the legislature and executive, which ensures common interests and shared purpose. "That theory," argues Sundquist (1988, 614), "identified the political party as the indispensable instrument that brought cohesion and unity, and hence effectiveness, to the government as a whole by linking the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common interest." Under unified government, shared electoral and policy motivations of the president and congressional majorities give majority party legislative leaders the incentive and capacity to use their tools and resources to pass legislation. In contrast, under divided government, differing policy and electoral interests are said to reinforce institutional rivalries between Congress and the president, which make it difficult to assemble the coherent policy majorities necessary to forge major legislation (Fiorina 1996 , chap. 6). Unified government, in this view, boosts the prospects for legislative success, while divided government makes it harder for Congress and the president to reach agreement on issues before them. Given electoral and policy differences during times of divided government, a simple divided government hypothesis follows: HYPOTHESIS 1. Divided party control of government increases policy gridlock, while unified control decreases gridlock.
But elections do more than simply divide up control of the major branches of government. They also determine the distribution of policy preferences within and between the two major legislative parties. At times, partisan preferences are polarized, with most legislators at the respective ends of the underlying ideological spectrum; at other times, greater numbers of legislators stand closer to the ideological center. The number of moderate legislators is important, because it likely affects the ease with which compromises are crafted and finalized. As Gilmour (1995) suggests, legislators are often likely to prefer disagreement to compromise, particularly if electoral incentives encourage the two parties to differentiate themselves. Thus, the more polarized the two parties, the greater is the incentive for them to distinguish their records and positions, and the lower is the incentive to strive for compromise and make legislative deals.2 If the presence of moderate legislators affects the ease of compromise, we should observe the following relationship: HYPOTHESIS 2. The greater the polarization of the partisan elite, the higher is the level of policy gridlock.
Elections also affect the distribution of policy preferences across the legislature more generally, independent of the partisan alignment of preferences. Indeed, we might expect different propensities toward gridlock in relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous legislatures. The broader the distribution of preferences, the greater the likelihood that legislators' goals will be incompatible, or at least the more difficult it will be to reach a suitable compromise. As suggested by Axelrod (1970, 5) , incompatibility of goals leads to higher levels of conflict and ultimately to episodes of "conflictual behavior." As preferences cohere within a legislature, policy compromise should become easier to achieve. All else equal, we might expect the relative heterogeneity of congressional preferences to affect policy stability. In short:
HYPOTHESIS 3. The more cohesive legislative preferences, the lower is the level of policy gridlock.
Finally, the timing of major electoral change is likely to have measurable policy consequences. A unified majority at the onset of an electoral realignment is likely to ensure legislative action, as realignments "provide a basis for relatively integrated, coherent, and effective governmental action" (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990, 36). Even major electoral shocks short of a realignment are likely to affect policy stability. The argument was well stated in a New York Times editorial in 1948 at the close of the 80th Congress, the first Republican Congress since before the New Deal:
The Republicans took control of Congress on the basis of an obvious popular revulsion against some of the policies of the Roosevelt-Truman administrations. There was no landslide but there was a perceptible movement of the political terrain. The new legislators certainly had a mandate to liquidate some war measures, to loosen some New Deal controls, to check some New Deal projects and to effect practicable economics ("Eightieth Congress: To Date" 1948).
The effects of such electoral shocks are likely conditioned by the length of time a new congressional majority was in the minority. The longer a new majority was not in control of Congress, the more dissatisfied it is likely to be with the status quo, and the greater is its incentive to make changes. There is also a strong electoral incentive for a new majority to prove that it can govern, which further increases the likelihood of altering the policy status quo.3 The relationship between electoral shocks and policy outcomes suggests the following hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 4. The longer a new congressional majority has been out of power, the greater is its dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the lower is the level of policy gridlock.
Elections, in short, affect legislative dynamics in ways other than allocating party control of Congress and the presidency. Indeed, if arguments about the effect of divided government are primarily about the influence of electoral and policy motivations on legislative outcomes, then theories of gridlock need to account for the multiple ways in which elections align policy and electoral interests within the parties and Congress more generally.
The Institutional Context
In contrast to the partisan models, institutional approaches suggest that structural arrangements alter the distribution of power within Congress and thus weaken the independent effect of party on legislative outcomes. Institutional and partisan frameworks are commonly portrayed as offering distinctive approaches to lawmaking models, and the inclusion of supermajority rules represents a break from theories more attuned to the effects of party dynamics. Tsebelis (1995) , and Tsebelis and Money (1997) suggest that bicameral legislatures alter the dynamics of policy change, which makes changes in the status quo more difficult than in unicameral bodies. Most important, policy stability depends on the distance between the two chambers (Tsebelis 1995). As shown by Tsebelis, movement of the critical players in a bicameral game away from each other shrinks the "winset" of the status quo-the set of all points that can defeat the status quo. Thus, as the preferences of the two chambers diverge policy stability increases, and change in the status quo becomes less likely.
The effect of chamber differences is not a recent discovery. The framers of the Constitution were careful to design two very different legislative bodies. Simply including an upper house to check the lower house was insufficient. As James Madison argued in Federalist No. 62, "I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all 522 proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government" (quoted in Wills 1982, 315; my emphasis). Madison's comments leave no doubt that the framers intended interchamber differences to come to the fore during the lawmaking process and that they expected such differences to have important policy consequences. Together, these theoretical and historical insights suggest that models of gridlock need to incorporate bicameralism. A simple bicameral hypothesis follows:
HYPOTHESIS 5. The greater the policy distance between the House and Senate, the higher is the level of policy gridlock.
Bicameralism is unlikely to be the sole institutional factor that shapes legislative outcomes. Supermajority rules, particularly in the Senate to limit debate, potentially restrict the ability of majorities to secure their preferred policy outcomes. Binder and Smith (1997, chap. 5), for example, show that the rate of death-byfilibuster has increased markedly since the middle of the twentieth century. Of course, the filibuster frequently is used to extract policy and political concessions during consideration of legislation, such that obstructionism need not kill the underlying measure. Still, an additional institutional hypothesis is worth exploring: HYPOTHESIS 6. The greater the threat of filibuster, the higher is the level of policy gridlock.
To the extent that institutional arrangements mediate the effect of legislative preferences on policy outcomes, both bicameralism and supermajority rules may be central to modeling the dynamics of legislative gridlock.
The Policy Context
Partisan and institutional factors alone are unlikely to account fully for deadlock. Because different types of policies yield different patterns of politics (Lowi 1964 ), the question is whether differences in the broader policy context affect the ease with which legislative compromise is reached. Budgetary slack and broad national trends are key features of the policy environment that can affect policy stability. The logic underpinning each factor is simple. First, the greater the surplus relative to outlays, the easier it is to accomplish legislative goals-whether these include creating new federal programs or cutting taxes. The assumption is that providing new benefits in any form is easier than cutting old ones, and providing new benefits is easier during better fiscal times. For example, according to one recent account of changes in legislative productivity over time, an "environment of constraint" in the 1980s reversed the liberal activism of the previous era (Davidson 1996, 34) . This leads us to expect:
HYPOTHESIS 7. The greater the federal budget surplus relative to outlays, the lower is the level of policy gridlock.
Second, prevailing national moods are said to have a significant influence on both agendas and outcomes.
The idea goes by different names-the national mood, the climate in the country, changes in public opinion, or broad social movements. But common to all of these labels is the notion that a rather large number of people out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that this national mood changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes (Kingdon 1984, 153 ).
One such national mood is a climate of opinion that favors governmental solutions to societal problems. As Mayhew (1991) argues, such periods of "public purpose" (Schlesinger 1986) Taken together, these eight hypotheses suggest a broad model of gridlock attuned to electoral, institutional, and policy correlates.
DATA AND METHOD
In this section, I present a measure of policy gridlock and a method for testing competing accounts of policy stalemate (details on measurement appear in Appendix B).
Dependent Variable: Measuring the Proportions of Gridlock
The definition of gridlock largely shapes how it is measured.4 I have in mind the simple idea suggested by C. Jones (1994, 196) , who argues that our primary concern should be to evaluate the "success of the system in treating public problems." Gridlock reflects the relative ability of the political system to reach legislative compromises that alter the status quo. Implied here is what Mayhew (1991, 34) terms "some actually-did-pass numerator over some all-that-werepossibilities-for-passage denominator." The question is how the denominator-possibilities for passageshould be defined and operationalized. Mayhew, after giving the matter considerable thought, decided to focus exclusively on the numerator. As argued earlier, however, a denominator is crucial to an evaluation of legislative performance over time.
My approach to identifying a denominator of potential enactments builds on the work of Cobb and Elder (1983, 85), who define the "systemic agenda" as "all 4 The pejorative connotation of gridlock is unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable. My use of gridlock, stalemate, or deadlock, implies no normative preference for legislative activity.
issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention." Similarly, Kingdon (1984, 3) defines the agenda as "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention to at any given time."5 What needs to be measured is the proportion of the agenda that fails to be enacted in any given period, in this case each two-year Congress.
The main task is to determine what constitutes the systemic agenda. I rely on daily unsigned editorials appearing in the New York Times between 1947 and 1996. The choice rests on the' assumption that the nation's paper of record responds to issues under consideration in Washington and highlights public problems that deserve attention.6 As former Washington Post editorial board member E. J. Dionne expressed it, an editorial writer's job is "to tack a notice up on the board ... to put an issue on people's radar screen" (personal conversation, April 3, 1998, Washington, DC). Current and former members of the Times editorial board concur. Their goal, they say, is to "get out in front of the news ... jump out in front of an issue before it gets covered in the news," although they recognize that they are often "driven by the news and reacting to the news" (interview with Steven R. Weisman, April 1, 1998, Washington, DC). Editorials, in short, capture issues at the "much talked about stage" (Mayhew 1991, 36) as well as issues that may be considered the "agenda of potential enactments" (pp. From the editorial pages of the New York Times I extract the issues that plausibly constitute the systemic 5 Focusing on "agendas" rather than "public demands" is preferable because of the inherent difficulty of determining what constitutes a demand. Quirk and Nesmith (1994, 192) define deadlock as "a failure to act, for whatever the reason, in the face of a pressing need or demand for action." Yet, they also recognize that it is difficult to determine demand in face of "countervailing demands or interests of comparable magnitude" that may in fact be served by the status quo (p. 209 n. 6). Moreover, it is not clear that public demand per se exists exogenous to the policy process and media coverage of such activity. On the interplay of public opinion, media coverage, and political activity, see, among others, Iyengar and Kinder 1987. 6 In recent decades, the Times is widely considered to espouse relatively liberal views, but because the editorials both support and oppose issues, there is no need to balance the data with information from a more conservative newspaper, such as the Wall Street Journal. A regional newspaper such as the Chicago Tribune (also considered conservative) was not a viable option: Its attention to national issues competes with coverage of local, state, and regional matters to a much greater extent than is the case for the Times, and its decisions about which national issues to cover are often strongly shaped by regional considerations (interview with N. Don Wycliff, Editorial Page Editor, Chicago Tribune, April 24, 1998, Chicago, IL). Moreover, Page (1996) suggests that the Times is an agenda-setter for other media outlets. Finally, the Washington Post proved unusable because it is so tightly focused on the daily life of Congress that almost no legislative activity escapes its notice. In 1997, for example, the Post ran nearly 900 editorials mentioning Congress, the House, or the Senate; in contrast, the Times ran about 500. Because the agendas developed from the editorials include issues that the Times supported as well as those it opposed, the lists are not a record of liberal initiatives supported by the newspaper. Furthermore, there is no bias toward issues that ended in stalemate rather than enactment: Of the 2,899 agenda items discussed over the fifty years, exactly half were enacted.9 Also, the Times did not write more often about gridlocked issues than those clearly headed for passage; the Pearson's r correlation between the number of editorials written per issue and the final outcome of the issue is 7 I make no claim that the agendas generated from the editorials are exogenous to the policy process. Cook (1998, 13), among others, has observed that "the political agenda is set not by the media by themselves or by the members [of Congress] by themselves but by the two sides, whether working together or in competition." 8 The peak in the 99th Congress seems to result from a higher than average appearance of certain types of policy issues on the pages of the Times in 1985 and 1986. In particular, the newspaper editorialized more frequently than normal on energy and public lands issues, and it voiced opinion on a larger than usual number of executive and judicial nominations pending before the Senate. 9 Because many issues appear in more than one Congress, the 2,899 items are not a count of the number of different issues discussed by the Times over the period. For example, motor voter registration appears in the data set three times (101st, 102d, and 103d Congress) and was mired in gridlock until the 103d, when it was enacted. Mayhew (1991, 41) states that his compilation of contemporary judgments ("Sweep One") "singles out one kind of legislative action and ignores others. It looks for the major direct innovative thrust ... but it overlooks the practices and logics of the appropriations process, imaginatively placed amendments, and incrementalism by way of small bills." My editorial method, in contrast, tends to capture these smaller legislative moments, including such issues as child vaccination (enacted in the 103d) and repeal of the oleomargarine tax (enacted in the 81st after stalemating in the 80th).
35-6). "I concern myself with the things my neighbors don't have time to think about," one former
Second, the editorial measure does not favor certain policy areas over others, which Mayhew considers to be a weakness of his approach. For example, my method does not slight defense weapons buildup, a policy area that tends to be overlooked by Mayhew's approach; the editorial measure detects fights over an alphabet soup of weapons production: the A-12 Avenger, the B-i and B-2 bombers, the MX and Midgetman missiles, and so on.1l Third, the editorial measure is not weakened by 10 The editorials also pick up important regulatory statutes enacted 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the grouped logit model are shown in Table 3 , column 1. Overall, the model performs well, explaining 54% of the variance in gridlock levels over the past half-century.22 Moreover, the model estimates show strong support for the partisan/electoral hypotheses and mixed support for the institutional and policy accounts. Most prominently, the coefficient for divided government is positive and statistically significant: Divided governments are prone to higher levels of gridlock. Although Mayhew (1991) convincingly shows that divided and unified governments do not differ in the quantity of landmark laws enacted, divided party control does appear to affect the broader ability of the political system to address major public problems. In this sense, the "party-government school" (Ranney 1954 Note: The entries in column 1 are weighted-least-squares logit estimates for grouped data (standard errors in parentheses). Time series model diagnostics based on OLS-generated residuals. *p < .05, **p <.01; one-tailed t-tests. Net change in the expected probability of gridlock is calculated as the independent variables change between the values in column 2 (i.e., between one standard deviation below and above the mean value for each of the continuous variables and between 0 and 1 for the dichotomous variable). Simulated probabilities are based on the exponential linear predictions generated by the adjust routine in Stata 6.0, and they are calculated assuming the presence of divided government (all other variables are set at their mean values).
ranges of the independent variables appear in Table 3 , column 2, and the associated changes in gridlock appear in column 3. Of the four partisan/electoral variables, a change from unified to divided party control has the smallest effect (increasing the level of gridlock by 8%), although the range of predicted probabilities of gridlock for the four variables is relatively small. Increased ideological diversity has the greatest influence (boosting gridlock 11%), followed by the effect of a larger number of moderate legislators. 
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Turning to the institutional variables, the bicameral context matters greatly. Even after controlling for the effects of elections on partisan alignments, when ideological differences between the House and Senate increase, Congress finds it harder to reach agreement on pressing policy issues, and policy stalemate climbs. Indeed, bicameral differences have the greatest substantive influence on the level of gridlock: As the distance between the House and Senate increase fourfold along the Left-Right spectrum, gridlock rises by 13%. This helps explain why students of Congress may have been "overly optimistic" (Sundquist 1995, 10) about the prospects for governance under unified government in the 103d Congress (1993-94). Only twice before in the postwar period were the House and Senate as far apart ideologically as they were in the 103d, and the last occurrence was twenty years previously (see Table 2 ). Given the high level of partisan polarization, it is no wonder that seasoned observers concluded at the close of the 103d: "The only good news as this mud fight finally winds down is that it's hard to imagine much worse" ("Perhaps the Worst Congress" 1994). While others have highlighted the constraining effects of supermajority rules to account for "unified gridlock" (Brady and Volden 1998; Krehbiel 1998), bicameral constraints clearly help determine the level of stalemate under unified regimes.
The results offer no support for hypothesis 5. The filibuster threat coefficient, although positive, fails to reach statistical significance. As shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 , moderate increases in the severity of the filibuster threat boost gridlock only 6%. Still, simulating levels of gridlock across more extreme differences in filibustering activity is instructive. Comparing a Senate with no filibusters (the 84th Congress in 1953-54) to the one with the most (22 in the 104th Congress in 1995-96), the predicted level of gridlock jumps from 42% to 53%. Although the effect of supermajority rules is swamped by other sources of variation in the legislative arena, it is premature to reject the hypothesis that Senate supermajority institutions have strong policy and political consequences.
Finally, there is mixed support for hypotheses 7 and 8. Mayhew (1991) found that major lawmaking was significantly and substantially higher during the activist era of the 1960s and 1970s. Substituting a measure of public opinion for Mayhew's "activist era" dummy variable still yields statistically significant results: A ten-point jump in public preference for activist government lowers gridlock by 8%. Conversely, as Mayhew (1991) also found, the budgetary situation has little effect on the legislative record of Congress and the president: As the budget shifts from large deficits to near surplus levels (column 2), gridlock eases by a mere 2%. Table 4 presents alternative specifications of the model to test whether the results are artifacts of the period and measurements chosen. First, I reran the analysis using an alternative measure of public mood (column 1). Because the Stimson data begin in 1952, including a lagged public mood variable limits the model in Table 3 , column 1, to the period from the 83d Congress (1953-54) through the 104th (1995-96). To test the model since 1946, I substituted Mayhew's activist era dummy variable for the lagged public mood variable (Table 4 , column 1). The results show that the estimates are robust to the two alternative indicators of public mood: Gridlock is significantly lower when national sentiment favors governmental solutions to policy problems. Moreover, each of the statistically significant coefficients in Table 3 , column 1, remains significant in the new model, with the exception of moderates and ideological diversity. Because the percentage of moderate legislators and the activist era dummy variables are correlated at .65, multicolinearity between the two may account for the differences across the two models.
Second, in Table 4 , column 2, I test an alternative measure of party control, using two dummy variables to distinguish different forms of divided government. Quasi-divided Govemment is coded 1 during the three congresses between 1981 and 1986 in which the Republicans controlled the Senate and the Democrats controlled the House, 0 otherwise. Pure Divided Goveminment is coded 1 during the 12 congresses in which a single party controlled Congress (and the other party controlled the presidency), 0 otherwise. In this specification, pure divided party control of government yields significantly higher levels of policy gridlock than does unified or quasi-divided control. In contrast, the level of policy stalemate under quasi-divided control is indistinguishable from that of other periods.
Finally, the results help make sense of the divergent conclusions reached by Mayhew and many of his critics. Although Mayhew found no effect of divided government on the production of important legislation, it clearly dampens the legislative performance of Congress and the president: A greater percentage of the agenda is likely to be killed under divided than unified government. Focusing solely on what is enacted, rather than on the agenda facing Congress, risks understating the effects of divided government. As much was suggested by Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) in their analysis of the effect of divided government on the 
Comparison of Results
In Editorials were then coded to determine the legislative issue at stake and the number of editorials written on the issue. As did Mayhew (1991), I dropped routine appropriations bills. Although the politics of appropriations can be used to study gridlock (Oppenheimer 1996) , judgments about their legislative fate in this context are problematic, because it is impossible to code objectively whether the final level of funding constituted success or failure. In all, nearly 15,000 editorials were collected and coded by a team of five college interns, a research assistant, and the author. To ensure the reliability of the coding, editorials coded by interns were also coded independently by the research assistant or the author. Intercoder reliability averaged 87%. Coding discrepancies were reviewed and resolved by the research assistant and/or the author.
Each agenda item was then coded as a legislative success or failure. For most cases, legislative fate was readily apparent from the yearly editions of Congressional Quarterly Almanac. If the Almanac provided no or ambiguous coverage, numerous sources were consulted, including the Thomas website at the Library of Congress, Legi-Slate's on-line bill retrieval service, and the U.S. Congressional Hearings Data Set maintained by the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the University of Washington. In most cases, it was relatively easy to match the Times discussion of an issue with its legislative fate. In the 104th Congress, for example, the Times called for passage of campaign finance reform, and no such legislation was enacted. Similarly, the Times opposed enactment of a bill making English the official language of the United States, and no legislation was enacted. In contrast, the Times advocated telecommunications, welfare, and immigration reform, and broad legislative packages were enacted on each by the 104th.
More difficult coding decisions arise when Congress and the president enact legislation that addresses only a portion of a larger issue. Many of these cases are not difficult to code, however, because the Times tends to adjust its editorials over the course of a Congress to discuss both legislative realities (small bills) and larger unresolved issues. The 104th Congress, for example, enacted a relatively narrow health care bill, the so-called Kennedy-Kassebaum Health Care Portability Act. It did not, however, address broader issues of medical insurance reform that have been on the agenda in recent congresses. In this case, the Times ran separate editorials on health insurance reform (eight editorials) and Kennedy-Kassebaum (six editorials). The former issue was coded as a failure; the latter, a success. Similarly, in the 101st Congress (1989 -90), a tax package was passed that addressed only some of the broad issues. In this case, however, the Times ran separate editorials on both a capital gains tax cut (twelve editorials), which was excluded from the final package, and expansion of the earned income tax credit (four editorials), which was included. Thus, although Congress addressed only some of the tax matters, the two issues are easily coded as failure and success, respectively. More difficult coding decisions are posed by legislation that significantly amends the original proposal. For example, in the 103d Congress (1993-94), Clinton proposed a major economic stimulus package that was later whittled down to a minor extension of unemployment benefits after a prolonged Senate filibuster. The outcome for the stimulus package was coded as failure, guided by analysis in Congressional Quarterly Almanac. When the Almanac proved inclusive about an outcome, news stories in the New York Times and Washington Post were consulted. If the result was still ambiguous, I erred on the side of coding the outcome as a success if elite opinion suggested that Congress had made a substantial effort to address the underlying issue. This minimized the risk of penalizing Congress and the president for compromising on legislation. Moreover, since I am interested in relative rather than absolute levels of gridlock, my primary concern was consistency in determining legislative success or failure.
Choosing a Salience Filter
To compare my analysis with previous research, it is essential to filter the agenda. First, to maintain consistency with Mayhew's (1991, 40) approach, I dropped all agenda items concerning executive and judicial nominations, internal congressional procedures, and foreign aid appropriations that involved no major statutory changes. As did Mayhew, I included treaties and constitutional amendments. Second, because the editorials generate agendas that encompass minor, major, and landmark issues, I developed the "salience filter." As shown in Table 1 There is no uniform effect of choosing one cut-off point over another. When gridlock scores are based on one or more Times editorial per issue and the analysis in Table 3 is replicated, bicameral distance and divided government remain statistically significant, but the lagged public mood, ideological heterogeneity, time spent out of the majority, and percentage of moderates are not significant. In contrast, if the cut-off point is five or more editorials, each of these variables except ideological heterogeneity is significant. A full set of results for six different cut-off points is available from the author and at the APSR web site.
